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ABSTRACT
The Multi-Fiber Arrangement is a classic case 
of protectionism that was justified as a departure 
from the principles of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to fulfill the spirit and 
purposes of the GATT. In this paper, I identify 
three fundamental objectives of the MFA: to 
liberalize trade in textiles; to achieve expansion, 
of trade while at the same time ensuring the 
orderly and equitable development of this trade 
and the avoidance of disruptive effects in 
individual markets; and, to further the economic 
and social development of developing countries by 
securing for them increased earnings from textile 
exports. I then examine empirical evidence to test 
whether these aims have been achieved. I find that 
none of the stated aims of the MFA has been 
fulfilled and that, worse, by establishing, in 
effect, a cartel of textile producers, the MFA has 
introduced unforseen negative consequences of its 
own; it has made it extremely difficult for late 
industrializing countries of the Third World, like 
Bangladesh, to exploit gains from comparative 
advantage; it has benefitted politically strong, 
anti-market industrializing nations, like China; 
it has created vested interests among exporting 
countries as they compete for economic rents; and, 
most important, it has entrenched protectionism in 
the international trading system.
v
THE MULTI-FIBER ARRANGEMENT IN THE LOOM OF NORTH-SOUTH
POLITICS
INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the Arrangement Regarding 
International Trade in Textiles, also known as the Multi- 
Fiber Arrangement (MFA), as a classic case of protectionism 
that predates by nearly a decade the protectionist challenge 
to the international trading order that began to emerge in 
the mid-1970s. It focuses on an important North-South issue 
that has become one of the thorniest items on the agenda of 
international trade. In the competition for markets between 
the North and the South, the textile industry has witnessed 
protectionism during the last thirty years and is, in fact, 
one of the most heavily protected sectors today.
The paper provides powerful evidence of limits of 
Northern tolerance for Southern competition. The textile 
industry is important to both developed countries (DCs) and 
less developed countries (LDCs), although it can be argued 
that it is more significant to developing countries given 
its labor-intensive character and low capital requirements. 
Developing nations enjoy a comparative advantage in trade in 
textiles and see it as a significant channel through which 
they can make in-roads into the development process. The 
North, however, has resisted imports from developing
2
3nations. They have closed their markets significantly to 
imports from industrializing countries, although they have 
kept their markets open to imports from developed countries!
Protection in this sector has bypassed the effective 
framework of the GATT. The paper demonstrates that although 
the explicit rationale of the Arrangement was in conformity 
with the broader purposes of the GATT, it was a fundamental 
departure from the established principles of the GATT. I 
provide empirical evidence to demonstrate that in the thirty 
years of its operation, the Arrangement has failed to 
achieve any of its putative goals. Worse, the Arrangement 
has introduced market distortions of its own and, in effect, 
by creating a cartel among textile exporters, has first, 
made it extremely difficult for late industrializing 
countries of the Third World, like Bangladesh, to exploit 
gains from comparative advantage. Second, it has benefitted 
politically strong, anti-market industrializing nations, 
like China. Third, it has created vested interests among 
exporting countries as they compete for economic rents. 
Fourth, and most important, it has entrenched protectionism 
in the international trading system.
Before examining the MFA, however, it is important to 
consider its significance in light of broader developments 
in the international trading order since the Second World 
War.
4GATT AND THE POSTWAR LIBERALIZATION OP TRADE
The collapse of the international economic system of 
the inter-war years set the stage for a new economic order 
after World War II. In the United States, the disastrous 
repercussions of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, 
whereby virtually every industry was rewarded with its own 
made-to-order tariff, taught the architects of the postwar 
order the folly of such legislation. The high trade barriers 
and their counterproductive results during the Depression 
helped to stack the cards in favor of pro-trade forces, 
providing the ideological momentum for liberal international 
trade.1 A wiser United States and a war-ravaged United 
Kingdom marshalled forces to reconstruct the economic system 
resulting in a new international economic order that 
recognized gains from free trade.
Such liberal sentiment was soon institutionalized. 
October 1947 witnessed the birth of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The preamble to the GATT 
eloquently declared its objective to be the pursuit of 
"reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed 
to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers 
to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment 
in international commerce." Two major principles of the GATT
1For a detailed account of the move towards trade 
liberalization after WWII and then the gradual move towards 
protection, see Jagdish Bhagwati, Protectionism 
(Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1989).
5were nondiscrimination and multilateralism. These principles 
ensured that no country would be discriminated —  any trade 
concessions made to one country would apply to all. Managed 
trade, which seeks quantitative targets of outcomes in 
trade, instead of setting rules and letting the chips fall 
where they may, was barred by the Agreement.
The decade of the fifties and sixties saw a tremendous 
growth in international trade based on these solemn 
principles of the GATT. It witnessed the emergence of such 
economic giants as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, and Singapore. 
Perhaps Japan offers the best example of the potential gains 
from free trade as the liberal trading order allowed Japan 
to recover from the cataclysmic events of the atomic bomb 
and emerge as an economic superpower.
However, by the second half of the 1970s, free trade 
had produced a fundamental reordering in the world's 
international economic and political relationships. The 
economic hegemony of America began to decline as Japan and 
then European nations lifted themselves out of the ruins of 
the world war. More importantly, as just mentioned, newly 
industrialized countries (NICs) began to emerge as economic 
forces to be reckoned with. This became a cause for much 
concern to developed countries as they began to lose their 
competitive edge in the world market. To preserve their 
leadership, rules governing international trade as embodied 
in the GATT began to lose their sanctity. The principles of
6free trade, nondiscrimination and multilateralism were cast 
aside and international trade witnessed rapidly increasing 
barriers that undermined the principle of free trade. These 
barriers, more often, came in the form of non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs) that included the imposition of import 
quotas, voluntary export restraints, administrative 
authorizations to import, price monitoring procedures, 
customs clearance procedures, and manufacturing and export 
subsidies. Of all the NTBs, the most popular one is 
voluntary export restraints (VERs). In the early 1970s, 
there were fewer than a dozen known VERs in force. In 198 0, 
the number had grown to 80. By 1990, the VERs totalled 200. 
Aside from growing in number and range of application, the 
VERs were directed with increasing frequency against exports 
from developing countries.2
Economists regard NTBs as worse than tariffs given 
their limited transparency and discriminatory character.
This is because they cannot be quantified as tariffs and 
therefore do not provide some basis for assessing an 
"equivalence" of concessions on each side for measuring the 
significance of the bargain struck; neither can they be 
reduced to bilateral agreements and then generalized.3 This
2Enzo Grilli and Enrico Sassoon, eds., The New 
Protectionist. Wave (New York: New York University Press, 
1990), 150-151.
3The GATT Negotiations 1986-1990: Origins. Issues and
Prospects (UK: British-North American Committee, 1988), 9-10.
7makes them highly discriminatory and difficult to negotiate
in the GATT rounds.
Thus, by the end of the 1970s, open trade was replaced
by "managed trade" that was discriminatory and largely
outside the effective framework of the GATT.
Managed trade —  restricting imports, protecting 
domestic workers/jobs, manipulating exchange rates 
so exports are cheaper, earning a balance-of- 
payments surplus —  means to break all GATT rules. 
Managed trade means it is better to protect the 
income of steel, of textiles, than raise the total 
income of the nation, the industrial countries, 
and the world. It means more detailed control over 
sectors, firms and employees because government 
never gets it right for all players. It means 
permanent control, permanent protection, permanent 
government intervention.4
Jan Tumlir, GATT’s director of economic research and
analysis from 1964 to 1985, sums up the situation in today's
international trading order well, when he says:
"The new protectionism is a very different animal.
It has been growing gradually. Industries have 
used intelligent long-term planning in creating an 
expanded system of protection. The expansion moves 
sectorally ... each tailored to the special needs 
of the industry in question.... The protectionism 
of the 1930s was openly adversary; the new one, 
however, builds on negotiation. As a result the 
new protectionism is politically stronger because 
it accommodates a broader range of interests....
For all these reasons the new protectionism will 
be much more difficult to roll back."5
4Douglas F. Lamont, Forcing Our Hand: America's Trade 
Wars in the 1980s (Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company,
1986), 118-119.
5Jan Tumlir, Protectionism: Trade Policy in Democratic 
Societies (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Policy Research, 1985), 38.
CHAPTER 1
Towards the end of the Second World War the United 
States and United Kingdom met to decide the shape of the 
postwar international economic order. Governments of both 
countries wanted to avoid the economic policy mistakes 
during the interwar years. The 1944 Bretton Woods conference 
produced an agreement to establish the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) institutions 
essential to an open trading regime, but limited in scope to 
international financial issues. In March 1948, over fifty 
countries signed the Havana.Charter to form an International 
Trade Organization (ITO). But after the U.S. Congress failed 
to approve American participation in the ITO, "all that 
remained after years of intensive negotiations was a trade 
agreement signed in October 1947 designed to record the 
results of a tariff conference that was envisioned at the 
time as being the first of a number of such conferences to 
be conducted under the auspices of the ITO."6 The results 
of this conference were codified in the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which consisted of the tariff
6Jock A. Finlayson and Mark W. Zacher, "The GATT and the 
Regulation of Trade Barriers: Regime Dynamics and Functions" 
International Organization vol. 35 no. 4 (Autumn 1981): 566.
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9concessions agreed to by the twenty-three signatories. Since 
the ITO failed to materialize, the GATT was transformed from 
a temporary agreement into a normative institutional 
framework in which governments pursued multilateral 
regulation and discussed trade policy.7
The preamble to the GATT eloquently declared its 
objective as the pursuit of "reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial 
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the 
elimination of discriminatory treatment in international 
commerce." In pursuance of its objectives, the GATT laid 
down rules codifying the principles of multilateralism and 
nondiscrimination that would enable Contracting Parties to 
reap gains from free trade. Some of the principal norms of 
the GATT are:
(1) Nondiscrimination: The former Director-General of GATT,
Eric Wyndham-White declared the principle of nondiscrimin­
ation as the "cornerstone" of the GATT.8 "In the immediate 
postwar era it was regarded as the crucial GATT norm, if 
only because the immensely powerful United States saw it 
necessary for the both the expansion of its own trade and 
the forestalling of hostile economic blocs."9 The GATT
7Finlayson and Zacher, 562.
8Eric Wyndham-White, "Negotiations in Prospect," in C. 
Fred Bergsten, ed. , Toward a New World Trade Policy: The
Maidenhead Papers (Massachusetts: D.C. Heath, 1975), 321.
9Finlayson and Zacher, 565.
10
The GATT commitment to nondiscrimination— or "unconditional 
most-favored-nation" (MFN) treatment, is cited in Article 
1:1 of the General Agreement and requires that "any 
advantage, favor, privilege, or immunity granted by any 
contracting party to any product originating in or destined 
for any other country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the like product originating in or 
destined for the territories as all other contracting 
parties." The fact that unanimous consent is required to 
amend Article 1 underlines the importance attached to 
nondiscrimination at the time of GATT's formation.
(2) A "fix-rule" trading regime: The Agreement explicitly 
stated in Article 16 that a "fixed-quantity" regime or 
managed trade which seeks quantitative targets of outcomes 
in trade, instead of settling on rules and letting the chips 
fall where they may, is to be rejected.
(3) Multilateralism: Bilateral discriminatory agreements 
were discouraged through this principle. Trade rules under 
the GATT were to be extended without discrimination and to 
all members of the trading regime alike.
(4) Open Markets: Markets were to be opened through 
conventional reduction in trade barriers, and new 
disciplines were sought to be established by resort to 
mutuality and balance of concessions.
(5) Reciprocity: Trade concessions were to be contracted on 
the basis of "reciprocity", so that there would be mutual
11
exchanges.
The regime of freer trade reflected in the formulation 
of the GATT was justified by the developed countries (DCs) 
with the formal argument of economic efficiency of 
international trade. Trade tends to promote the 
international division of labor, to allocate limited 
resources and thereby to raise the standards of living in 
all trading countries. From this perspective, all of the 
GATT's work would be directed towards eliminating as many as 
possible barriers to international trade. Therefore, GATT 
Article XI prohibits the use of quotas or measures other 
than duties to restrict either imports or exports. The 
experience of widespread and escalating use of quotas during 
the 193 0s influenced the ITO-GATT draftsmen to try to 
abolish this technique of trade restraint.10
Immediately following the birth of the GATT, the world 
witnessed an unprecedented growth in the volume of 
international trade. World trade expanded five fold between 
1950 and 1970; world production expanded 4.5 times.11 World 
economic expansion quickened after 1960. Between 1960 and 
1972 world trade grew by an average rate of 7.9 per cent a
10John H. Jackson, The World Trading System; Law and 
Policy of International Economic Relations (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1989), 129.
11Penelope Hartland-Thunberg, Trading Blocs. U.S. 
Exports.and World Trade (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), 1.
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year, world GNP by an average of 5 percent.12 These twenty 
years of remarkable gains in the volume of international 
trade have come to be known as the golden years of the GATT. 
Under the auspices of the GATT, there have been eight rounds 
of multilateral trade negotiations,13 each succeeding in 
reducing tariff levels substantially. In the United States, 
for example, the average tariff declined by nearly 95 
percent over the forty years between the Geneva Round of 
1947 and the start of the Uruguay Round in 1986— from an 
average of nearly 13 percent on dutiable imports in 1946 to 
an average of less than 5 percent by 1988.14
The less-developed countries have, however, long 
maintained an ambivalent position vis-a-vis the GATT. The 
ambiguous language of the safeguard clause was a special 
cause for concern. Under the GATT safeguard clause (Article 
XIX), emergency protective action, such as imposition of 
quantitative restrictions or an increase in tariff rates, is 
permitted when imports enter "in such increased quantities 
or under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious 
injury to domestic producers." However, the word "serious" 
was not defined in the Arrangement. Nor did it establish
12Hartland-Thunberg, 1.
13Geneva 1947; Annecy 1949; Torquay 1951; Geneva 1956; 
Dillon 1960-61; Kennedy 1964-67; Tokyo 1973-79; Uruguay 1986-
1990:
14John H. Jackson and William J. Davey, Legal Problems of 
International Economic Relations (St. Paul: West Publishing,
1986), 9.
13
time limits for the lifting of such safeguards. Article XIX 
thus makes it difficult to define the boundary between 
safeguard and protection and has increasingly been exploited 
by the industrial countries.
Also, labelling it a rich man's club, the LDCs' 
objections were rooted in the notion that neoclassical trade 
theory has little to offer for their specific problems. They 
were critical of the Agreement, alleging that, given the 
different levels of economic development between the North 
and South, across-the-board rules were not fair.
Additionally, the LDCs denounced certain specific rules 
of the GATT: reciprocity appeared to be hardly suitable to 
economic "have-nots": nondiscrimination seemed to threaten 
infant industry, whose protection was considered necessary 
for rapid industrialization.
For these reasons, the LDCs lobbied for special 
treatment under the rules of the GATT. At the first United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) a 
report was designed to focus attention on the need for 
special rules for the trade of developing countries. Since 
this idea of preferences was inconsistent with the MFN 
clause, a new legal exception to MFN was drafted for the 
benefit of developing countries. In 1971, the Generalized 
System of Trade Preferences (GSP) was established which 
agreed to a "mutually acceptable system of generalized non­
reciprocal and non-discriminatory preferences which would be
14
beneficial to developing countries."15 "However, [the GSP]
is still what we might call a subsidiary norm since the
major trading states appear willing to make only limited
sacrifices to promote the trade interests of the developing
countries."16 In 1979 contracting parties accepted an
"Enabling Clause" which set up a permanent legal framework
for the differential and more favorable treatment of LDCs in
international trade relations, notwithstanding the
provisions of Article 1 (1) of the General Agreement. The
main provisions of the text read as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of the 
General Agreement, Contracting Parties may accord 
differential and more favorable treatment to developing 
countries, without according such treatment to other 
Contracting Parties.17
The GATT has come to be regarded by most economists as 
the anchor of the postwar international trading order. It is 
accepted as the constitution of the international trading 
system. The GATT framework encompasses basic elements needed 
to institute a viable system of international trade 
regulation: an arena to discuss and review different 
policies and trends; a capacity to formulate rules to guide 
behavior and adapt to changing conditions; and a means to 
resolve, formally and informally, trade disputes arising
15UNCTAD Proceedings 2nd. sess., vol. 1 (1968): 38.
16Jock and Finlayson, 582.
17GATT, Document L/4903 of December 3, 1979.
15
among its members.18 It thus lends stability and 
predictability in the trading environment.
However, since the mid-197 0s, the GATT has not been 
able to guide or regulate international trade as it did 
before. Some economists, therefore, have argued that it has 
become less effective and credible as a trade 
constitution.19 Trade experience shows that over the last 
two decades, countries have ignored the mandate of the GATT 
and the ideals for which it stands. The history of North- 
South international trade reveals that in some sectors, like 
textiles, the North bypassed the principles of the GATT. 
Industrialized countries like the U.S. and consortiums like 
the EEC, have imposed quantitative barriers to trade, and 
have also conducted trade that is discriminatory by nature. 
They removed trade barriers for each other but erected 
increasingly stringent barriers for developing countries, 
although the GATT explicitly stated that trade should be 
conducted on the principle of nondiscrimination.
As pointed out earlier, such discriminatory protection 
came in the form of NTBs which affect suppliers more 
adversely than tariffs. "NTBs may be defined as including 
all governmental policies and practices which serve to
18John H. Jackson, "GATT Machinery and the Tokyo Round 
Agreements" in Trade Policy in the 1980s ed. William R. Cline 
(Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics,
1987), 160-61.
19Robert M. Stern, ed. U.S. Trade Policies in a Changing 
World Economy ( Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1987), 344-45.
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distort the volume, direction, or product composition of 
international trade."20 GATT studies have shown that the 
share of world commodity export value of LDCs, other than 
Southern European and oil-exporting countries, declined from 
19 percent to 12 percent from 1955 to 1976. Among other 
causes, reduced export earnings caused the same countries' 
share of commodity imports to fall from 21 percent to 15 
percent over the same period.21
Table 1.
Relative Share of Imports Subject to Nontariff Measures, 
May 1985 (World Trade Weighted)
Agriculture Manufac
turing
Textiles 
& Clothing
UNITED STATES 
Imports from 
all countries 11.5 5.6 47.8
industrial countries 11.7 2.7 25.5
developing countries 11.8 14.4 65.3
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
Imports from 
all countries 37. 8 10.1 42.4
industrial countries 46.7 5.7 13.6
developing countries 27.5 21.4 65.2
Source: Julio J. Nogues, Andrzej Olechowski, and Alan 
Winters, The Establishment of Non-tariff Barriers to 
Industrial Countries' Imports. World Bank Department 
Research Department Discussion Paper No. 115 (January 1985).
20American Economic Review Vol LXI no. 2 (1971): 196.
21Hartland-Thunberg, 20.
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The table above illustrates the rise in protectionism 
in the form of NTBs and reveals the discriminatory pattern 
of protectionism whereby industrialized nations have a freer 
access to each other's markets as compared to market shares 
of developing countries.
The table reveals that the textile sector has been 
unusually singled out for restrictions. Such protectionism 
warrants closer examination and this is what the paper 
focuses on. In the following chapters, I examine the 
rationale and implications of the MFA. In the next chapter,
I provide a brief history of the MFA, stressing its 
increasingly protectionist nature which is in contradiction 
to the aims cited in the text of the Arrangement. In 
chapters 3, 4, and 5 I identify three principal aims of the 
Arrangement which were: to achieve the expansion of trade, 
the reduction of barriers to such trade and the progressive 
liberalization of world trade in textile products; to 
achieve the expansion of trade while at the same time 
ensuring the orderly and equitable development of this trade 
and the avoidance of disruptive effects in individual 
markets; and, to further the economic and social development 
of developing countries. In each of these chapters, I take 
up each of the aims individually and provide empirical 
evidence to show that none of the stated aims has been 
fulfilled or worked towards since the Arrangement came into 
effect.
CHAPTER 2
International trade in textiles accounts for nearly 
five percent of the total world trade and nearly nine 
percent of world trade in manufactures. The textile industry 
is significant to the national economies of both developed 
as well as less developed countries. It provides employment 
to a large percentage of the national population of both the 
Northern and Southern countries. In the United States, for 
example, one out of eight industrial jobs is in the textile 
or apparel industry, which employs over 2.25 million 
workers, including nearly 1 million women and minorities.
The textile and apparel industry supports an additional 
million workers in other sectors of the U.S. economy, 
including agriculture, manufacturing, transportation, and 
services.22
The importance of the textile sector in less developed 
countries cannot be overstated. It is one of the major 
industries in which developing nations enjoy comparative 
advantage, given the relatively unsophisticated methods of 
production and low wages. It does not require massive 
capital investment as most other industries do. Most
22Ying Pik Choi, Hwa Soo Chung and Nicolas Marian, The MFA 
in Theory and Practice (London: Francis Printer, 1985), 3.
18
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importantly, its labor-intensive characteristic is a boon 
for overpopulated Third World countries. It is a haven for 
unskilled and semi-skilled laborers found in abundance in 
these economies. The industry employs approximately 30 
percent of the labor force in all developing countries.23
Today, the textile and apparel industry is by far the 
most protected industry in the world. In fact, duties on 
textile imports are over six times the average of non- 
textile imports. For nearly twenty-five years, under the 
Multi-Fiber Arrangement, the United States and other 
industrialized countries have taken special measures to curb 
imports of textiles and apparel from developing countries. 
Protection in other sectors like steel and automobiles have 
come and gone but the textile industry has not witnessed any 
relief from restrictive trade barriers. By 1990 the United 
States had 1000 individual quotas and 3 8 bilateral 
"agreements", all negotiated under the MFA.
The following discussion examines the origins of the 
MFA and traces its historical record of increasing 
protectionism. I show how it was supposed to be a temporary 
arrangement for a period of four years to give the developed 
nations the time to regain their competitive edge and how it 
continued its lease on life so that it exists to this day.
23"The Rag Trade: On the Road from Mandalay," Economist 
303 (April-June 1987): 67.
20
BIRTH OP THE MPA
The roots of the MFA can be traced to the early 1960s 
with the signing of the Short Term Cotton Textiles 
Arrangement (STA) in 1961, followed by the more 
comprehensive Long Term Cotton Textile Arrangement (LTA) in 
1962. During the 1950s, the US cotton textile industry was 
facing a crisis due to an excess capacity in cotton 
textiles, a rising demand for synthetic fibers, and more 
important, increased imports from Japan. To redress these 
difficulties, at least partially, American decision-makers 
confronted Japan. The Japanese were asked either to restrain 
their exports of cotton textiles "voluntarily" or face the 
possibility of Congress passing quotas on Japanese goods, 
the spread of state and local boycotts against Japanese 
textiles, and the implementation of restrictive tariffs, 
which were likely to be recommended by the United States 
Tariff Commission.24 The outcome was the first VER in 
postwar period. Japan, with its heavy reliance on American 
markets for its textile trade, agreed to "voluntary" 
restraints, fearing to enter into any legislated bilateral 
agreements that "might at any time be upset by a capricious 
Congress."25 This proved to be a watershed in the history
24David B. Yoffie, Power and Protectionism: Strategies of 
Newlv Industrializing Countries (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1983), 43.
25Susan Strange, "The Management of Surplus Capacity", 
International Organization 33 (Summer 1979): 311.
21
of North-South protectionism. It set the precedent for the 
next thirty years of crippling restraints in the 
international textile trading regime.
At this time developing countries like India, Portugal, 
Hong Kong and Egypt stepped in and began to flood U.S. 
markets with their cotton textile exports. The U.S. 
government concluded that some sort of a global market 
arrangement was necessary to limit imports. It set up the 
Working Party on the Avoidance of Market Disruption in 1959. 
Under its aegis, in July 1961 an international Short Term 
Arrangement (STA) was established. It authorized one-year 
restrictions for 64 categories of cotton textiles to avoid 
market disruption until a more permanent mechanism could be 
negotiated. In February 1962, 19 major trading nations 
adopted the Long Term Arrangement (LTA) which was renewed in 
1967 and again in 1970 through 1973 to facilitate "orderly 
development of the trade in such products [cotton textiles] 
so as progressively to increase export possibilities of less 
developed countries and territories of Japan, while at the 
same time avoiding disruptive conditions in import 
markets.1,26
"Disruptive conditions" were defined as instances of 
sharp import increases associated with low import prices not 
attributable to dumping or foreign subsidies. The LTA,
26G. Paterson, Discrimination in International Trade: The 
Policy Issues. 1945-1965 (N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1966), 309.
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therefore, targetted imports from developing countries as 
these nations were the low cost suppliers. Also, the LTA 
provided that restrictions could be applied against 
individual countries rather than on a most-favored-nation 
basis. The Arrangement, therefore, violated two significant 
principles of the GATT— nondiscrimination and multi­
lateralism.
Since the LTA regulated intervention only in cotton 
products, LDCs stepped up exports of wool and man-made fiber 
products. In response the US government drafted the 
Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles which 
sought to expand the LTA to encompass trade in man-made 
fiber and wool-based products in addition to cotton 
textiles. Thus the Multi-Fiber Arrangement was born. "The 
MFA marked the beginning of a highly sophisticated, 
comprehensive protectionism ... establish[ing] a precedent 
for multilateral restrictions that [were] potentially more 
harmful than anything that preceded it."27
The first Arrangement (MFA I) appropriated from the LTA 
the "market disruption" concept, the authorization to 
negotiate bilateral agreements, and the power to impose 
unilateral quotas. As a concession to exporters, a 
quantitative specification was laid down with respect to the 
restrictions. There was to be a minimum 6 percent annual 
growth rate in quotas for products under restraint.
27Yof f ie, 162.
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Exceptions were provided to this rule. For example, growth 
rates could be lower than 6 percent when it was clear that a 
situation of market disruption would recur if the higher 
growth rate was applied. This "exception" clause was used 
frequently by developed nations. For example, for the wool 
industry, U.S. bilateral agreements under the MFA have 
provided for growth no more than 1 percent annually on 
grounds that a higher growth rate would cause market 
disruptions at home.
When the MFA came up for renewal in 1977, member states 
pressed for greater control over LDC exports. The extension 
protocol renewing the MFA contained an amendment that 
allowed "jointly agreed reasonable departures". How "jointly 
agreed" the departures were between developed and developing 
countries is debatable. MFA II not only allowed growth of 
quotas at less than 6 percent but also zero or negative 
growth in products considered "sensitive" by importing 
countries. The EEC managed to use this clause to establish 
global quotas for all low cost-countries for a number of 
what it considered to be "sensitive" products: cotton yarn, 
cotton fabric, spun synthetic weaves, knit shirts, sweaters, 
trousers, blouses and woven shirts.28
28Joseph Pelzman, "The Multi-Fiber Arrangement" in I. 
William Zartman, ed. Positive sum: Improving North-South
Negotiations (New Jersey: Transaction Books Inc., 1987), 156- 
157 and William R. Cline, The Future of World Trade in 
Textiles and Apparel (Washington D.C.: Institute for
International Economics, 1987), 153.
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In December 1981, MFA III was signed. The new element 
introduced was that of "anti-surge" which allowed the 
developed nations to take "appropriate" measures against 
sudden sharp increases in imports of sensitive products. 
"Market disruption" was redefined to include the overall 
growth of the market for the product in the importing 
country and thus could take into account any decline in 
growth resulting from any factor. In 1983, the Reagan 
administration authorized a new "trigger" mechanism for 
initiating "calls." A "call" is a governmental action to 
restrict imports of a category of textiles or apparel not 
already under quota restraints. The government makes a call 
by issuing a market statement which spells out the factors 
which in its judgment is creating a situation whereby 
domestic producers are being injured. Under the new 
procedure, market disruption will be presumed to have 
occurred and discussions for controls will be triggered 
automatically when (i) global imports of a specific category 
of goods has grown by 3 0 percent or when the ratio of 
imports to domestic production is greater than 2 0 percent 
and (ii) when imports from a specific supplier country equal 
one percent of total US production in that category. "MFA 
III is a standstill agreement. It protects the biggest 
producer of textiles, the United States, and the largest 
importer and exporter of textiles, the European Community.
It does not give the non-Lome, non-Mediterranean less
25
developed countries a chance to expand their textile and 
clothing exports. No magic of the market place is permitted 
to work for the less developed countries under MFA III."29
In July 1986 MFA IV was signed for five years. It 
underscored the determination of the signatories to continue 
protectionism in the textile sector. Restrictive elements 
like the anti-surge tool, a broadening of the coverage to 
include all vegetable fibers like silk and ramie, 
reaffirmation of the lower positive growth rate in the case 
of "recurrence of exacerbation of a situation of market 
disruption" and the recognition of the rate of growth of per 
capita consumption as a relevant indicator in recurrence and 
exacerbation of a market disruption situation, made the MFA 
IV emerge as a highly protectionist Arrangement that finds 
no parallel in international trade.
In the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations (1986-1990), 
the MFA featured prominently on the agenda. Again, the North 
won the rounds of debates so that the MFA has been renewed 
again, although for only two years. It is scheduled to 
expire in December 1992.
RATIONALE OF MFA
For all its protectionist history, the stated 
objectives of the MFA were noble, calling for the promotion
29Douglas F. Lamont, Forcing Our Hand: America's Trade 
Wars in the 1980s (Massachusetts: D^ .C. Heath and Company,
1986), 157.
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and liberalization of trade in textiles and Third World 
development. Article 1 stipulated the aims of the MFA:
—  to achieve expansion of trade, the reduction of barriers 
to such trade and the progressive liberalization of world 
trade in textile products. (Article 1, para. 2)
—  ensuring the orderly and equitable development of this 
trade and avoidance of disruptive effects in individual 
markets and on individual lines of production in both 
importing and exporting countries. (Article 1, para. 2)
—  to further the economic and social development of 
developing countries and secure a substantial increase in 
their export earnings from textile products. (Article 1, 
para. 3)
Thus, DCs as well as LDCs were to benefit. The MFA was 
explicitly justified as a temporary device to give the 
textile industry of the developed countries the time and 
breathing space to regain its competitive edge while 
ensuring at the same time that developing countries did not 
lose their advantages from trading in a sector in which they 
enjoyed comparative advantage. Trade was to expand, to 
become open and liberal, and markets in both sets of 
countries were to be prevented from disruption.
However, the MFA has not achieved its aims. Either the 
aims were ignored in trade transactions or conceptual 
weaknesses were exploited. This is what I focus on in the 
following chapters.
CHAPTER 3
"The basic objectives shall be to achieve the expansion of 
trade, the reduction of barriers to such trade and the 
progressive liberalization of world trade in textile 
products..."
Article 1, para. 2
The MFA established the promotion and liberalization of 
trade in textiles as one of its essential aims. During the 
drafting of the MFA, developed countries defended the 
Textile Arrangement on grounds that it would promote world 
trade by increasing the number of developing countries 
exporting textiles. They argued that open competition for 
access to the markets of developed countries would have 
resulted in a few efficient developing countries capturing 
an even larger share of the world export market than they 
would have under the MFA. Their justification for the 
Arrangement was that since it provided them the right to 
impose and regulate quotas, they could provide quotas to 
small suppliers and new entrants by cutting back on imports 
from larger suppliers. Thus the MFA would promote trade by 
getting more countries into the orbit of international trade 
by either providing market shares or increasing market
27
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shares.30
The table below gives an idea of market shares of 
developing countries in developed-country textile markets.
A cursory glance at the table would lead one to believe that 
less developed countries were significantly flooding 
developed-country markets. For example, imports into OECD 
countries from these suppliers rose from under $600 billion 
in 1963 to $2.8 billion in 1973 and $8.7 billion in 1984.
Table 2.
Imports into the OECD from 25 developing countries, 1963,
1973, and 1984
(million dollars, percentage shares in parentheses)
1963 1973 1984
China 30.6 (5.2) 329.0 (11.6) 329.0 (11.6)
S outh Ko re a * 4.4 (0.8) 303.3 (10.7) 1,038.5 (12.0)
Taiwan * '. 7.4 (1.2) 221.2 (7.8) 734.6 (8.5)
Hong Kong 72.5 (12.3) 306.4 (10.8) 545.0 (6.3)
Singapore n.a. 26.7 (0.9) 31.6 (0.4)
Subtotal 114.9 (19.5) 1186.6 (41.8) 3,891.7(45.0)
Pakistan 35.7 (6.0) 267.3 (9.4) 534.4 (6.2)
Bangladesh n. a. 44.2 (1.6) 255.0 (2.9)
India 308.3 (52.2) 423.3 (14.9) 706.3 (8.2)
Sri Lanka 0.2 (0.0) 0.5 (0.0) 7.8 (0.1)
Thailand 0.6 (0.1) 45.8 (1.6) 246.2 (2.8)
Indonesia 0.4 (0.1) 4.0 (0.1) 119.8 (1.4)
Philippines 2.7 (0.5) 17.8 (0.6) 37.6(22.0)
Subtotal 347.8 (58.9) 802.9 (28.3) 1,907.0(22.0)
[continued next page]
30Arthur Dunkel, "Lessons from Textile Experience for 
General Trade Policy," World Economy Vol. 4 (1984): 364-366.
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1963 1973 1984
Haiti 2.9 (0.5) 6.7 (0.2) 15.9 (0.2)
Dominican Rep. 0.0 (0.0) 0.1 (0.0) 3.2 (0.0)
Costa* Rica 0.0 (0.0) 0.4 (0.0) 1.4 (0,0)
Colombia 1.4 (0.2) 38.9 (1.4) 56.2 (0.6)
Peru 0.3 (0.0) 2.6 (0.1) 115.0 (1.3)
Brazil 1.9 (0.3) 144.7 (5.1) 573.3 (6.6)
Argentina 2,3 (0.4) 9.8 (0.3) 11.1 (0.1)
Uruguay 1.4 (0.2) 2.7 (0.1) 22.6 (0.3)
Subtotal 10.2 (1.7) 205. 8 (7.2) 798.8 (9.2)
Greece 6.4 (1.1) 122.9 (4.3) 411.3 (4.8)
Portugal 58.7 (9.9) 262. 1 (9.2) 575.1 (6.6)
Spain 29.1 (4.9) 109.9 (3.9) 451.8 (5.2)
Turkey 2 . 5 (0.4) 78. 1 (2.7) 467.9 (5.4)
Yugoslavia 20.7 (3.5) 72.9 (2.6) 152.6 (1.8)
Subtotal 117.3 (19.9) 645. 9 (22.7) 2058.8(23.8)
Total 590.2 (100) 2,841.2 (100) 8,656.3 (100)
n.a. not available
Source: OECD, Foreign Trade bv Commodities, series C, Vol. 
2, DRI Data Base.
If these nominal values are deflated by an index of 
unit values of exports from industrial countries, the annual 
growth rates in real terms was 11.1 percent in 1963-73 and 
4.0 percent in 1973-84.31 Growth in the 1970s was therefore 
relatively slow especially when seen in comparison with 
overall manufactured exports from developing countries
31William R. Cline, The Future of World Trade in 
Textiles and Apparel (Washington, D.C.: Institute for
International Economics, 1987), 141.
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(defined narrowly to exclude processed foods and copper) 
which grew in real terms at 15.6 percent annually from 1965 
to 1973 and 12.4 percent from 1973 to 1980.32
From the data provided it is evident that in the early 
1960s, India and Hong Kong dominated developing country 
exports of textiles. Later in the decade and early 1970s, 
South Korea and Taiwan achieved extraordinary export growth 
to capture approximately 10 percent of textile exports each. 
In a third distinct phase, mainland China emerged forcefully 
in the market to capture nearly 18 percent of developing- 
country exports of textiles.
It is clear from the table that there has been no 
similar explosive growth in exports from countries other 
than Korea, Taiwan, and China. On the contrary, there have 
been major declines in market shares: for India, from 52 
percent of•-textiles in 1963 to 8 percent in 1984? Colombia's 
market share was halved from 1.4 to 0.6 percent. By region, 
.the five East Asian countries doubled their share in 
textiles from 1963 to 1984 to nearly half of the export 
market. In contrast, the rest of Asia, including India, 
experienced a decline in trade share from 59 percent of 
developing-country exports in 1963 to only 2 2 percent in 
1984. In Latin America, only Brazil achieved a relatively 
large share of textile exports. For their part, the 
Mediterranean countries of Europe held relatively constant
32Cline, 141.
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market-shares, at approximately one-fifth of developing- 
country exports.
The table therefore reveals a highly skewed 
distribution of textile exports from developing countries to 
the industrial countries. The four big suppliers (Hong Kong, 
Korea, Taiwan and China) in 1984 accounted for 44.6 percent 
of textile exports. This extreme concentration raises 
significant policy issues. In particular, it means that 
insofar as the protection regime gives rise to quota rents 
for suppliers, a disproportionate share of these rents have 
been captured by the four East Asian countries. (Economic 
Rents and their effects will be discussed in detail in 
chapter 5). The MFA, therefore, has not expanded trade in 
textiles for developing countries as a bloc. Selected 
countries have had market shares increased at the expense of 
weaker nations or new-comers.
The case of China warrants special attention. As is 
evident from the table, China's exports of textiles have 
accelerated rapidly in recent years. United States 
authorities have tended to be more accommodating to China 
than to the other large East Asian suppliers. This is 
because China is in a much stronger position to threaten 
political retaliation against restriction. Thus, the final 
version of the 1985 bill for textile quotas in the United 
States omitted China from the large cutbacks to be imposed 
on the other three large East Asian suppliers because
32
legislators were concerned that China would close its own 
market.33 Previously, China had succeeded in repelling 
tighter restrictions by threatening to cut off imports of 
agricultural products from the United States.34
Africa is absent from the list of the top 2 5 
developing-country suppliers of textiles. It must be 
stressed that open trade in these products could be 
especially important to many low-income countries in Africa. 
These sectors are among the few for which the 
unsophisticated level of industrial production in these 
countries permits exports. While African nations typically 
do not face quotas today, the scope for future growth of 
their exports is necessarily constrained by the overall 
regime of textile protection, which probably already 
discourages investment for export expansion by posing the 
threat of quota imposition if exports do rise substantially. 
"In a regime of open trade, relatively rapid growth of 
textile exports from latecomers among developing countries 
could be expected. There would probably be a natural 
evolution away from concentration of these exports among 
Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. In a regime of protected 
global trade in textiles, policymakers play a major role in
33Washincrton Times. 1 July 1986, A8.
34I.M. Destler and John Odell, "The Politics of Anti- 
Protection: Changing Forces in United States Trade Politics" 
in William R. Cline, ed., Trade Policy in the 1980s 
(Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1987),
143.
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allocating the scarce resource of an export market among the 
many claimants in the developing world. It is not clear that 
the present method of this allocation is either the most 
equitable or the most efficient."35
Thus, the system of managed trade that the textile 
sector has been subjected to tends to create circumstances 
in which established firms, countries with already 
substantial export interests and large trading nations enjoy 
advantages over new firms, countries with as yet small 
export sectors and developing countries in general. It can 
be concluded therefore that the MFA did not liberalize and 
expand trade. MFA I stipulated that quotas would grow 
annually by 6 percent. However, no attempts were made to 
increase levels of quotas, and bilateral agreements were 
negotiated with sharply limited quota growth. For example, 
the U.S. government, in 1977 offered Hong Kong a five year 
agreement limiting the increase in quotas to 1.5 percent.36 
Since 1974, when the first MFA came into effect, not once 
has a quota for any country been increased by the target 
annual rate of 6 percent.
The MFA, therefore, did not realize its objective of 
trade liberalization in textiles. It may have opened markets 
for some countries like China, liberalizing trade with them.
35Cline, 143.
36Susan Strange, "The Management of Surplus Capacity", 
International Organization 33 (Summer 1979): 317.
34
It did not do this, however, on a nondiscriminatory basis.
It closed or reduced market shares for politically less 
favored countries like India. The MFA has hence not 
succeeded in reducing trade barriers or discrimination but 
has instead given the DCs a legal mechanism to erect and 
tighten barriers— a mechanism for doing so in discriminatory 
ways.
CHAPTER 4
"The basic objectives shall be to achieve expansion of trade 
while at the same time ensuring the orderly and equitable 
development of this trade and avoidance of disruptive 
effects in individual markets."
Article 1, para. 2
"The determination of a situation of "market disruption", as 
referred to in this Arrangement, shall be based on the 
existence of serious damage to domestic producers or actual 
threat thereof. The factors causing market disruption are a 
sharp and substantial increase or imminent increase of 
imports of particular products from particular sources."
Annex A
This chapter is essentially a continuation of the last: 
the previous chapter discussed the MFA aim of promoting and 
liberalizing trade; this chapter examines how conditions 
were stipulated in the very same Article whereby 
liberalization could be curtailed, and the volume of imports 
from developing countries cut back drastically. The 
conditions of import restrictions were phrased in ambiguous 
terms which the North has interpreted to its own purposes. 
The chapter begins by discussing this conceptual weakness in 
the Arrangement, and then focuses on the question, "Is 
market disruption in the textile sector primarily caused by 
imports from developing countries"?
As cited above, one aim of the MFA was to avoid "market
35
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disruption? How do we know when it exists? Who is 
responsible for the disruption? What caused it? How do we 
define "orderly growth"? How do we distinguish attempts to 
assure "orderly" growth from protectionism? Nowhere in the 
Arrangement do we find explanations or answers to these 
basic questions.
Markets can be classified into product and factor 
(labor and capital) markets. Markets are disrupted when 
either of these fails to clear. In an ideal market, market 
disruption never occurs. In the real world, of course, 
markets rarely function perfectly. Disruption occurs 
periodically, but this is the way competition always works. 
In the case of the textile industry, we find a factor market 
disruption. This has manifested itself in the form of 
unemployed labor. For over twenty-five years, the MFA has 
been justified, and in fact, has been made more 
protectionist, on grounds that market disruption has 
occurred in the textile industry of developed countries and 
has been caused by "sharp and substantial" increases or 
"imminent increases" in imports from "low cost" suppliers. 
How much is "sharp"? How much is "substantial"? How is 
"imminent increase" determined —  what factors tell us that 
imminent increase is occurring? There is no clarification or 
qualification of any of these terms in the Arrangement. The 
term "market disruption" lies at the core of the 
Arrangement. Its acceptance and incorporation legitimized
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the discriminatory imposition of quantitative restraints 
against developing countries. What this chapter is 
particularly interested in, therefore, is establishing 
whether, in fact, the so-called market disruption (here 
interpreted as loss of jobs in the textile sector) has been 
caused by imports from developing countries.
In the course of the last twenty five years, 
industrialized nations like the U.S. have complained of 
market disruption, or unemployment due to imports from 
developing countries. Economists in their findings have, 
however, argued that such a connection between imports and 
unemployment in the textile sector is extremely limited:
"What is interesting is...that import competition 
causes only a small fraction of employment losses for 
most industries. The bulk of employment change comes 
from changing labor productivity, real wages, general 
levels of demand, or changes in expenditure patterns. 
The fact that these results seem to hold up using a 
variety of methods suggests robustness, and makes it 
difficult to comprehend the continued vociferousness of 
labor and industry."37
Using various methods of analysis, economists have 
attacked the argument that imports are adversely affecting 
employment in the textile and apparel industry. Peter Isard
37Catherine Mann, "Foreign Competition and Employment in 
Import-Sensitive U.S. Industries" in Khosrow Fatemi, ed. 
International Trade: Existing Problems and Prospective
Solutions (New York: Francis and Taylor, 1989), 176.
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(Vintage-Capital model)38, Charles R. Frank, Jr.39, Anne O. 
Krueger40 (Accounting Method), Catherine Mann (General 
Equilibrium Model)41, and Richard B. McKenzie (Statistical 
Regression Analysis)42 have all reached the conclusion that 
job losses in the textile and apparel industry can be 
attributed to mechanization, rising labor productivity and 
consumer demand and preferences.
This chapter focuses on the impact of domestic 
variables on employment in the textile sector. The 
introduction of sophisticated technology and its effects, 
the concomitant rise in labor productivity, and fundamental 
changes in skills required by the industry appear to be the 
most important cause of employment erosion. In addition, 
consumer demand and industrial competitiveness have, in 
varying degrees, affected employment in the industry over 
the last three decades.
38Peter Israd, "Employment Impacts of Textile Imports and 
Investment: A Vintage-Capital Model,1 American Economic Review 
Vol. 63, No. 3 (June 1973) 402-16.
39Charles R. Frank, Jr., Foreign Trade and Domestic Aid 
(Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977), 27.
40Anne O. Krueger, "Protectionist Pressures, Imports and 
Employment in the United States," Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics Vol. 82, no. 2 (1980), 133-146.
41Catherine Mann, 174-195.
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TECHNOLOGY AND ITS EFFECTS
In the 1960s, the conjuncture of a booming economy, the 
relatively steep decline in interest rates, revision of 
depreciation rates, beneficial tax adjustments and rising 
imports encouraged textile firms to invest in new equipment. 
Capital investment more than doubled in the five years from 
$330 million in 1961 to $820 million in 1966. The seventies 
witnessed smaller outlays due to the recession but by 1977 
the outlays had recovered to $1.2 billion. Capital 
expenditure began to climb steadily once again reaching 
$1.62 in 1980, soaring to $2.0 billion in 1987 and then 
hitting a record high of $2.2 billion in 1988 and 1989.43
Such massive investments saw the textile industry 
emerge as one of the most mechanized manufacturing sectors 
in the US.44 These investments radically modified existing 
machinery, and introduced high-tech machinery and equipment 
including micro-electronic technology like computers.
Computer-controlled operations are growing on an 
extensive scale in the textile and apparel industries. They 
are now used directly in labor processes such as running 
looms, dyeing and finishing. Robots, controlled by 
computers, have increasingly replaced semi-skilled and
43U.S. Industrial Outlook, various issues/years
44Lauren Benton, Thomas R. Bailey, Thierry Noyelle, and 
Thomas M. Stanback, Jr. , Employee Training and U.S. 
Competitiveness: Lessons for the 1990s (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1991), 46-47.
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unskilled workers as they have been programmed to perform a 
wide array of functions ranging from unloading materials 
from trucks to placing heavy beams of yarns in racks, from 
placing the filling yarn on conveyor belts to delivery to 
weaving sheds. Computers have been introduced in accounting, 
inventory control, production planning and inspection of the 
plant.
Such automation has filtered into every production 
process. Manual operations including creeling (loading), 
doffing, repairing broken fibers, operating machine controls 
have been transferred in varying degrees to machines,
sometimes integrating distinct processes to increase
efficiency. The spinning operation is a prime example of 
such transference and integration. Workers in this process 
used to comprise approximately 20 percent of all mill 
machine workers. The new technique, "rotor" or "open-end 
spinning", has eliminated this 20 percent of the textile 
labor force. Productivity has in turn increased 400 to 500 
percent by eliminating the conventional spindle and 
integrating the roving, spinning and winding process. Also, 
while manual doffing took an average of 18.65 minutes, 
automatic doffing performs the same task in 7.07 minutes.45
Sophisticated technology, brings in its wake high labor
productivity. Between 1973 and 1984 textile employment
45Barry A. Turchil, Capital-Labor Relations in the U.S. 
Textile Industry (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988), 26-27.
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decreased by approximately 2 64,000 workers while, at the 
same time, worker productivity rose by 49 percent. Overall 
(1960-1984 period) worker productivity, defined as monetary 
value of real shipments per worker, increased 147 percent, 
rising in real (1984) dollars from $31,407 per worker in 
1960 to $77,526 per worker in 19 8 4 . 46 According, to an index 
compiled by the Department of Commerce, between 1977 and 
1990, textile mill productivity, as measured by output per 
worker hour has increased some 37 percent. This averages out 
to 3.9 percent, versus, 3.0 percent for all manufacturing 
annually.47 (A one percent increase in productivity in 
textiles can be expected to lead to a 0.4 6 percent reduction 
in textile employment) ,48
State-of-the-art technology has mechanized labor 
processes and enhanced labor productivity to such high 
levels that there has been a fundamental change in the need 
for, and type of workers in, this industry today. Managers 
see a much more urgent need for literacy and math skills 
among their operators to run the machinery. Workers have to 
have the ability to respond to a more varied, faster 
changing work environment. They have to have a broader grasp 
of the production process if they are to contribute to the 
goal of preventing rather than simply responding to machine
46McKenzie, 164.
47Industry Surveys, October 1990, Volume 2, T78.
48McKenzie, 170.
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stoppages.
With such a fundamental change in the production 
process, it is inevitable that employment will be affected. 
Thus, to attribute market disruption to imports from 
developing countries is to ignore the fact that the problem 
is largely internal and to shift responsibility for 
adjustment from domestic to international actors.
THE EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN CONSUMER TASTES
Consumers are ultimately the most important 
determinants of production and supply of any product. The 
textile and apparel industry, particularly the apparel 
industry is extremely vulnerable to the whims of consumers. 
The business is a risky one, due largely to the frequent 
changes in seasons, styles, and fashions. This volatility is 
a nonimport-related cause of some of the attrition that took 
place in the industry. Some decline in the number of firms 
and in employment in particular product segments within the 
apparel industry resulted from changes in consumers' 
preferences. Men's tailored clothing, women's dresses, and 
heavily tailored coats lost ground to more casual, 
nontailored varieties, separate blouses and skirts, 
pantsuits and year-round raincoats. In addition, the move to 
women's separates also decreased the demand for full slips. 
Many companies went out of business by attempting to hold on 
to these declining product lines, rather than shifting to
43
more promising ones.49
Also, the industry finds itself constantly guessing as 
to how much consumers are willing to spend on textiles and 
clothing for a particular year or season. Consumer spending 
over the years has been very sluggish and erratic. In 1988, 
for example, the apparel industry found that consumers kept 
their wallets and pocketbooks tightly closed going on a 
sudden shopping spree towards the end of 1988 and early 1989 
when annual consumer spending stood at 8.1 percent above 
year earlier levels. It then began a steady decline, hitting 
6.2 percent by October. Although apparel expenditure has 
been climbing since 1975, from $65 billion in 1975 to 165 
billion in 1989, apparel expenditure as percentage of 
disposable income has shown a steady decline since 1975. 
While in 1975, the percentage was 5.4, by 1985 it was 4.7, 
reaching a record low of 4.5 in 1989. Hence consumption has 
not helped the industry at all. Low levels of consumption 
have either forced the industry to cut back production, or 
as in the case of smaller enterprises to close down their 
plant. Thus to identify imports as the main reason for 
unemployment is simply inaccurate.
49Jeffrey S. Arpan, Jose de la Torre and Brian Toyne, The 
U.S. Apparel Industry: International Challenge. Domestic
Response (Georgia: Business Publishing Division, Georgia State 
University, 1982), 95.
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INTRA- AND INTER-INDUSTRY COMPETITIVENESS
Inter- and intra-industry competition has also caused a
significant displacement of workers. Domestic competition
with other industries over traditional textile markets has
been increasing. For example, developments in the
manufacture of paper and plastics forced textile
manufacturers to compete in domestic markets such as bagging
and automobile upholstery.
"In any competitive industry, competitive 
attrition always takes place. Many of the US 
apparel firms that closed in the past two decades 
would have closed even without import competition, 
because they could not compete with more efficient 
domestic firms."50
During the last couple of decades, the textile and 
apparel industry has undergone a major structural change. 
Intra-industry competition has wiped out a large number of 
smaller units in the industry. The introduction of new forms 
of technology and synthetic fiber production is affordable 
mainly to large firms. They are in a better position to 
exploit discoveries and find new markets. Smaller 
enterprises cannot compete effectively with consolidated 
firms such as Burlington Industries and J.P. Stevens that 
have become pacesetters in the industry. And bankruptcies 
and mergers have increased since the early 1960s, displacing 
a large part of the textile and apparel labor force.
Thus, most of the jobs lost in the textile and apparel
50Arpan, et al, 93.
45
industry in the last three decades were caused by plant 
modernization, changes in demand, and industry consolidation 
rather than by imports from low-cost suppliers.
CHAPTER 5
"A principal aim in the implementation of this Arrangement 
shall be to further the economic and social development of 
developing countries and secure a substantial increase in 
their export earnings from textile products and to provide 
scope for a greater share for them in world trade in these 
products...1
Article 1, para. 3
The MFA thus embodied a noble aim of Third World 
country development. One way the MFA was supposed to benefit 
developing countries was by providing them quota rents.
Quota rent is the value of import licenses equal to the 
difference between the domestic market wholesale price of 
the product and the tariff-inclusive supply price of the 
competing import. In the case of an import-licensing scheme, 
the recipients of the import licenses are likely to enjoy 
the quota rents. In the case of a voluntary export-restraint 
agreement like the MFA, since quotas are administered by the 
exporting country, the exporting country in principle 
captures the quota rent. The distribution of rent within the 
exporting country varies according to the peculiarities of 
the allocation system of each restrained country, and the 
amount of the rent depends upon the strength of demand and
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degree of restraint.51
COST OF RENT-SEEKING ACTIVITIES
Technically, rents are beneficial, providing exporting 
countries with additional earnings. In reality, however, 
rent seeking or the competition for rents involves high 
costs for the seekers, as demonstrated by Anne Krueger.52 
The process of acquiring rents nullifies its benefits. The 
real resources used up in such activity are generally 
regarded as being wasted because their use does not create 
new wealth but merely transfers existing wealth between 
groups or individuals. Rent seeking takes various forms, the 
most obvious of which are direct lobbying of politicians 
(involving such costs as trips to the capital city and 
establishing premises there), over-investment in physical 
plant (to qualify for licenses allocated in proportions to 
firms' capacities), bribery and other forms of corruption. 
Krueger's findings reveal that in many countries these quota 
rents (and the associated rent-seeking costs) can be very 
large indeed. For example, she calculates that in India in 
1974, total rents amounted to 7.3 percent of GNP. Of this 
figure, rents associated with import licenses represented
51Ying-Pik Choi, Hwa Soo Chung and Nicoleas Marian, The 
MFA in Theory and Practice (London: Frances Pinter, 1985),
105.
52Anne 0. Krueger, "The Political Economy of the Rent- 
Seeking Society'?, American Economic Review 64 no. 2 (1976):
291-303.
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over two-thirds. In 1978, quota rents in Turkey were 
calculated to be about 15 percent of GNP. Moreover, there is 
reason to suppose that the rent seeking associated with 
quota licenses is just the tip of the iceberg. For example, 
by including other distortions such as price controls and 
rationing, Mohammed and Whalley estimate total contestable 
rents to be somewhere between 3 0 and 45 per cent of GNP.53
While it is true that some developing countries are 
partly compensated by these rents, their importance has been 
exaggerated. It is not clear how much of the rent accrues to 
the exporting country in actual practice.•Trade diversion 
erodes the potential rent accruing to developing countries 
as importers can buy from non restrained sources. Moreover, 
the restrained supplier also runs the risk of not being able 
to fill his export quota, for which he will be penalized by 
his own government by being allocated a smaller export quota 
next period.54
QUOTAS AND VESTED INTERESTS
New entrants, small suppliers, and poor countries with 
little or no political clout are unable to reap any of the 
benefits stemming from quota rents so that they suffer with
53S. Mohammed and J. Whalley, "Rent Seeking in India: Its 
Cost and Policy Significance" in Neil Vousden, The Economics 
of Trade Protection (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), 75.
54Choi, et al. 106.
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no hope of economic or social development. This is mainly 
because quota rents cause vested interests. In fact, a 
recurring theme in a study of the MFA by the GATT 
Secretariat in 1984 was the role of the vested interests 
created by the MFA.55 The study showed that under a system 
of voluntary export-restraint agreements, there is a need to 
develop procedures for distributing the export-1icenses.
This can stimulate the creation of cartel-like agreements 
among existing exporters which tend to keep out new firms.
If the export licenses, as is usually the case, are 
distributed on the basis of past performance, new firms may 
not be able to get on the allocation list or may receive 
only a token amount of export licenses. As in the case of 
the quota rents, this creates vested interests in the status 
quo among established exporting firms.56
QUOTAS AND PRODUCT QUALITY
Another line of defense for the MFA was that quotas 
encourage restrained countries to upgrade the quality of 
their items. How far is this true? Small suppliers and new 
entrants do not experience these advantages. Their 
industrial base is modest compared to that of leading 
supplier countries. They do not possess the machinery
55GATT Secretariat, Textiles and Clothing in the World 
Economy. GATT Doc. 84-1473 (Geneva: GATT Secretarial, 1984).
56Arthur Dunkel, "Lessons from Textile Experience for 
General Trade Policy", World Economy Vol. 4 (1984): 363-364.
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required to produce material that is of a higher quality 
than those produced in countries like Japan and Hong Kong.
It was argued that if a country was unable to compete 
due to failure to upgrade its quality of product, this would 
have beneficial consequences. It would encourage the 
country to move into less-restrained or non-restrained 
categories and tap new markets, or diversify out of clothing 
and textiles into more capital-intensive industries, such as 
automobiles, chemicals and steel. However, experience shows 
that when a country diversifies into a non-restrained 
category, with the growing specter of protectionism it is 
not long before the non-restrained category becomes a 
restrained one.
As Ying-Poi Chik, et al. point out, quota systems have 
demonstrated adverse effects over the years: 57
1) Most quota allocations tend to favor established firms at 
the expense of new firms, thereby inhibiting competition 
among firms and reducing efficiency in the textile and 
clothing industry of developing countries. This encourages 
the cartelization of firms, which tends to raise the price 
of textiles and clothing products, not only for exports but 
for domestic consumption as well.
2) The bilateral restrictions tend to place a heavy 
administrative burden on developing countries which may lack 
the experience and capacity to run the system efficiently.
57Ying-Pik Choi, et al, 25.
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Where an administrative infrastructure is in place the 
discretionary power of the bureaucracy in allocating quotas 
tends to favor larger, more established firms.
3) The quota system entails much more uncertainty for 
potential investors and policy makers alike than other forms 
of protection. It is hard to gauge when policy makers will 
render the quotas more or less restrictive, since quota 
system is subject to pressure from protectionist lobbies and 
other political considerations. This element of uncertainty 
adversely affects small suppliers more than large suppliers 
as larger suppliers are able to recover faster than poorer 
nations if an expected quota has been denied.
Therefore, technically, quotas entail benefits for 
restrained suppliers, but it must be stressed that these 
gains are dwarfed by losses stemming from having to restrain 
exports, and therefore production and employment, in sectors 
in which they possess clear comparative advantage. Import 
controls in viable industries like textile and clothing has 
slowed economic growth in most developing countries. The 
reduction in the capacity to import capital goods has been 
particularly significant in recent years because of severe 
balance of payments constraints and growing debt burdens. 
During the 1970s and 1980s Mexico and Brazil each 
accumulated over $100 billion in foreign debt. For either 
country the foreign debt exceeds its annual GNP and is
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several times its foreign exchange earnings each year.58
THE CASE OF BANGLADESH
Article 1, para 3 obliges developed countries to avoid 
actions that would adversely affect the economies of the 
developing exporters. However, evidence proves that these 
obligations have not been respected. Restraints have been 
imposed on imports from developing countries without 
consideration of their level of economic development. Even 
poor, heavily-aided countries like Bangladesh have found 
themselves subjected to substantial restraints.
Bangladesh is one of the poorest countries in the 
world. Like any other developing nation, her exports are 
predominantly agricultural. In particular, the heavy 
dependence on jute and jute products (Bangladesh's chief 
item of export —  the world demand for which had decreased 
noticeably between 1965 and 1983) meant that other exports 
had to emerge to fill the gap left by the shrinking demand. 
Fortunately for her, businessmen from the Republic of Korea 
ventured into Bangladesh to transfer finance and technology 
for increased production of clothing. The result was several 
new clothing companies, leading to increased volumes of 
clothing exports that were competitive in world markets. 
Bangladesh's exports of clothing increased from almost
58Khosrow Fatemi, ed. , International Trade: Existing
Problems and Prospective Solutions (New York: Taylor and
Francis Inc., 1989), 5.
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nothing in fiscal year 1980-81 (less than one percent of 
total exports) to about twelve and a half percent in fiscal 
year 1984-85.59 Unfortunately for Bangladesh, she proved to 
be too competitive. The United Kingdom, France, the United 
States and Canada, all slapped quotas on Bangladesh, albeit 
in accordance with provisions of the MFA and bilateral 
agreements under it.
It is necessary here to look at the statistics of 
Bangladesh's imports into the developing nations to get an 
idea of the injustice meted out to her. In 1984,
Bangladesh's share of imports of manufactured goods into DCs 
from LDCs amounted to 0.3 percent, compared with 50 percent 
for East Asia's super-exporters (Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan 
etc.). Bangladesh's share in DCs' imports of clothing from 
LDCs amounted to 0.2 percent, whereas imports from the 
super-exporters accounted for more than 60 percent. And, in 
the case of total clothing imports of the US from LDCs in 
1984, Bangladesh had a share of 0.32 percent as against 66.7 
percent for the super-exporters.60
The immediate impact on production in Bangladesh was to 
close down operations that had just started.up. It is true 
that production capacities in Bangladesh were being expanded 
very rapidly but is such action justified in the case of a
59Dean Spinager, "Will the Multi-Fiber Arrangement Keep 
Bangladesh Humble?" World Economy Volume 8 (1988): 78.
60Spinager, 80.
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country like Bangladesh, even if it is strictly speaking 
legal? Being one of the countries at the very bottom of the 
development ladder, Bangladesh learned how special is the 
treatment actually accorded to her. The elbow room in 
foreign trade for a country without international political 
clout is limited, at least in textiles and clothing, the 
natural starting point of an export-oriented strategy for 
development.
CONCLUSION
Thus, we see that the North has not fulfilled an 
important objective of the MFA— to assist the development of 
developing countries. It has instead, inter alia, reduced 
their export earnings, in turn reduced their capacity to 
import sophisticated machinery that is so essential for 
production and, consequently, development. The MFA has 
reduced benefits from specialization as it has forced 
developing countries to forgo output and exports in an 
industry in which they have comparative advantage. More 
important, it has reduced employment opportunities. A common 
characteristic of developing countries is overpopulation. It 
is well known that an advantage of expanding trade is 
increased employment. The North, through the MFA, has 
deprived the South from giving its burgeoning numbers an 
opportunity for employment and improving its standard of 
living. We cannot even begin to determine the consequences
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of protectionism under the MFA when it is imposed on a poor, 
densely populated country like Bangladesh where the current 
population is 116.6 million and expected to double in less 
than 28 years'
CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion has made it clear that the MFA 
did not realize its stated aims. Textile trade has not 
expanded; there has been no reduction in barriers to textile 
trade; and, no progressive liberalization of world trade in 
textiles. LDCs have not witnessed gradual increases in 
market shares as promised by the MFA. Quotas never rose 
annually by the stipulated figure of 6 percent.'
Each protocol of renewal was more stringent than the 
previous preventing liberalization that may have occurred if 
the ’'magic" of market place was allowed to work.
The MFA did not benefit all developing nations as was 
expected. It prevented most of them from reaping benefits 
stemming from comparative advantage. It provided the 
industrialized countries a legal mechanism to impose 
restrictions and hence precluded them from increasing export 
earnings through trade in textiles. Newly industrializing 
countries were singularly affected by the MFA. They were 
squeezed out by politically stronger suppliers like the 
NICs, which enjoyed higher status in the international 
trading order, and prevented them from breaking in and
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securing market shares. In addition, competition for rents
involved high costs which they could ill afford.
The MFA has emptied the GATT of much of its substantive
content. The basic GATT principles of nondiscrimination,
predictability and transparency, so essential for an
efficient liberal trading order have been eroded.
Admittedly, industrialized countries attempted to reconcile
the MFA with the spirit of the GATT: the stated objectives
of the MFA promised liberalization of textile trade,
avoidance of market disruptions, and the economic and social
development of developing nations. However, in execution,
the MFA consistently and unambiguously violated the spirit
of the GATT. It violates the most-favored-nation principle
by permitting discriminatory treatment among supplier
countries. It breaks the general GATT mandate of applying
tariff rather than quota protection. It undermines the
principle of assured market access through tariff binding by
making access contingent. Importantly, the MFA also
establishes a precedent of imposing quantitative
restrictions against developing nations (in this case Japan
as well) but not against industrial countries.
The gap between the developed countries' rhetoric on
free trade and fact, as evidenced through the MFA, has been
well expressed by Hugh Corbert, Director of Trade Policy
Research Center in London:
If the liberal principles of the international trading 
system, as expressed by the General Agreement on
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Tariffs and Trade (GATT) are to be preserved for the 
benefit of all, merely verbal assertions by the 
governments of developed countries of their commitment 
to these principles are not enough. Governments have to 
demonstrate that they mean what they say. They have to 
repudiate the precedents for departures from those 
principles. They have to convey a signal to the 
unprotected industries. In short, they have to start 
dismantling restrictive trade measures such as the 
Multi-Fiber Arrangement, 'voluntary' export restraint 
agreements, and non-tariff devices which destroy 
trade.61
No causal link has been established between low-cost 
imports from "particular sources" and "market disruption" in 
importing countries. Yet, the MFA has now entered its fourth 
decade, becoming more protectionist with each renewal. It 
was stated in no uncertain terms that the Arrangement would 
be temporary. Yet it has controlled trade and allocated 
market shares in textiles for over thirty years.
Besides affecting LDCs adversely, the MFA has also 
imposed costs on American consumers. Total consumer costs of 
protection amount to $2.8 billion annually in textiles. The 
average American householder pays about $238 every year to 
retain some 235,000 jobs in the textile and apparel sectors 
rather than elsewhere in the global economy. The consumer 
cost per job saved is approximately $135,000 in textiles.62
It would not be wrong to state that the North has a 
narrow vision of reality. It ignores certain fundamental
61Hugh Corbert, Preface to Costs of Protecting Jobs in
Textiles and Clothing, by Martin Wolf (London: Trade Policy 
Research Center, 1984), xiv.
62Cline, 15.
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facts of economics. Third World nations will endeavor to 
develop economically and socially. They will step up exports 
of goods in which enjoy comparative advantage. Any growth of 
manufactured exports by developing nations means competition 
for developed nations. Many industries in the developed 
nations will have to downsize as they to- reduce their costs 
in order to compete. Layoffs will occur. New opportunities 
are created. Adjustments have to be made. This is how a free 
market works.
To turn to protection as a response to competition is 
unwise. Experience has shown that import restrictions rarely 
solve the problems of a domestic industry in the way that 
they were originally intended to. Such restrictions 
generally become a shelter from world competition and an 
excuse to avoid dealing with the problem of productivity, 
quality, innovation, and price. Rather than growing 
stronger, the industry becomes dependent on government 
protection and falls further behind its worldwide 
competition. The MFA is a highly protectionist Arrangement 
that should be phased-out if there is to be an international 
trading order in textiles that is open and liberal, just and 
equitable, a trading order envisaged by the GATT.
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